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Through a cost-minimizing approach, this paper derives four joint indicators to assess the ef-
ciency of the mix of sovereign debt currencies between the countries belonging to the European
Monetary Union (EMU). This theoretical insight enables us to explain why and how the intro-
duction of the euro and the adoption of a common monetary policy may have led to signicant
changes in debt structure among EMU members, notably in favor of further euro-denominated
debt. The interplay of intrinsic and strategic variables yields stylized facts that are consistent with
country-specic empirical evidence. Following the sovereign debt crisis, we further emphasize the
value-added of a coordinated debt issuance policy among EMU countries.
I. Introduction
The 2010-11 European sovereign debt crisis, triggered by concerns over the credit risk of the Greek
government debt, has shown that euro-denominated bond spreads are largely driven by direct default risk.
The common currency acts as a cushion against the temptation to perform competitive devaluations to avoid
mere default by distressed governments. This case emphasizes that the adoption of a common monetary
policy has substantially altered the market perception of the key drivers of sovereign debt value. This major
breakthrough nevertheless has raised many questions about the evolution of yield spreads for xed income
securities issued by the Eurosystem member countries. Investors and other market participants scrutinize
for (un)sustainable debt levels and countrys debt vulnerability in valuing sovereign debt. Fiscal decits
and projections for the debt-to-GDP ratio are standard indicators for investors to assess the riskiness of a
countrys sovereign debt. However, these indicators alone do not reect the whole situation of a countrys
debt. It is also relevant for investors to review the (in)appropriateness of the countrys currency debt structure
(proportion of domestic currency denominated debt vs. foreign currency denominated debt) and its maturity
prole. From that perspective, no indicator can be looked at in isolation. Moreover, if the euro triggered
a noticeable change in the relative cost of domestic and foreign debt of European Monetary Union (EMU)
member states, one should also observe a corresponding shift in the debt management indicators. These
questions are addressed in this paper.
We adopt a cost-minimizing approach to the problem of dening the appropriate mix of debt currencies
with their associated maturities by sovereign governments, which should be their formal goal to reassure
investors about their debt management process. Our approach entails the existence of a complete market,
which implies that the governments political commitment is rmly set and known by market participants at
the very moment of the review of debt composition. Consequently, we take as given the level and expected
evolution of taxes and government expenditures, which have been rmly set and communicated to the market.
Nevertheless, the impact of these sovereign decisions on the current and future costs of debt is accounted for.
Under the framework developed by Du¢ e and Singleton (1999), the yearly cost of sovereign debt is
represented by its continuous yield spread. The objective function to minimize should thus be the sum of
the total cost incurred over the lifetime of debt denominated in domestic and in foreign currency. Such an
approach allows us to stick to the nancial modeling of yield spreads and to focus on the identication of
their determinants. To be convincing, the decision of issuing domestic or foreign debt with their respective
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maturities by a government obviously implies a trade-o¤ between the costs associated with each type of issue.
Such costs are likely to be di¤erent for countries from outside or inside the EMU, but also among members,
depending on whether debt policies are coordinated or not. To assess the appropriateness of both debt
structure and maturity prole, we derive four composite indicators throughout our theoretical framework:
the intrinsic and strategic default, devaluation (including ination), liquidity, and the exchange rate risk.
These four debt e¢ ciency indicators must be taken into account altogether since the outcome will be the
result of an interplay between them. The optimal solution that we obtain is an explicit function of these four
sources of risk. It enables us to consider the sources and direction of changes in yield spreads consecutive to the
EMU advent, and to deliver theoretical results regarding the predicted change in debt currency composition
after the adoption of the euro.
Our modeling approach also allows us to identify a potential improvement in the way governments could
nance at the lowest possible cost. A central, coordinated approach to determine debt levels and maturities
would result in a Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. The idea of Euro bonds raised in September 2011 was a step in
that direction, but it was motivated by urgency. Long-term economic gains shared across the EMU countries
could be achieved by designing a more structural mechanism. The theoretical directions of our framework
are matched with data collected on ten EMU member countries during the immediate pre- and post-EMU
period. Through evidence gathered from the evolution of debt-related variables, our empirical results indicate
that the predicted directions of policy changes are overall consistent with the observed evolution in sovereign
debt data.
The next section reviews the evolution of the sovereign debt structure issued by EMU members before and
after the advent of the euro in 1999. Section III proposes a theoretical model deriving the optimal currency
structure for countries that do not belong to a monetary union. Section IV analyses the impact of the EMU
on the model. Section V matches the theoretical predictions with stylized facts. Section VI concludes.
II. Evolution of the debt characteristics of EMU members
Overall, the literature reaches a broad consensus on the regime switch within the dynamics of sovereign
bond spreads triggered by the achievement of the EMU. Following the removal of exchange rate risks, Wolswijk
and de Haan (2006) nd that the strategies of government debt managers in the EMU countries have evolved
towards a convergence of practices since the introduction of the euro. Two key features among these countries
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are the decline in the share of the debt denominated in non-euro currencies and the tendency to issue plain
vanilla bonds. In this respect, Gilson and Gérard (2002) state that a decrease in foreign currency denominated
debt will be observed when a central bank starts to be perceived as a credible institution able to commit to
low ination.
Yield spread decomposition is essential for deriving policy implications (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009).
Credit risk stands as an important determinant of the spread of government debt denominated in foreign
currencies. It is associated with market discipline and the sustainability of public nances. Codogno et al.
(2003), Geyer et al. (2004), Jankowitsch et al. (2006), Beber et al. (2009) and Favero et al. (2010) document
that the default risk premium is lower for the rst years of the EMU. More recently, however, sovereign
credit spreads surged following the 2007 nancial crisis and a risk transfer from the nancial to the public
sector (Attinasi et al. 2009, Eijsing and Lemke 2011). However, Governments with relatively favorable scal
positions may benet from lower relative borrowing costs in times of crises, while increasing scal decits
are likely to increase spreads across all countries (Haugh et al. 2009, Attinasi et al. 2009). Arnold and
Lemmen (2001) also argue that the EMU has increased credit risk by denying governments the emergency
exit of money creation.
Liquidity risk is another component of yield spreads, translating imperfect bond market integration.
Jankowitsch et al. (2006), Gomez-Puig (2006), Beber et al. (2009), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009), and
Favero et al. (2010) generally nd that liquidity e¤ects play a non-trivial role but cannot alone explain the
size of the cross-EMU government bond yield spreads. Such a point of view is consistent with Bernoth et al.
(2004), who nd that the liquidity premium is reduced with EMU membership.
Tables 1 reports key average rates and debt data for 10 EMU countries1 during the time window sur-
rounding the freezing date of parities of local currencies against the euro (January 1, 1999). The window is
split between the pre-EMU (1994-1998) and the post-EMU (1999-2010) periods. The country of reference for
the spread computations is Germany, which has the strongest currency and the lowest ination among the
EMU members. (Daily) swap rate and 10-year benchmark government bond yield data come from Thomson
Financial Datastream. Public debt data come from the Central Government Debt statistical yearbook, pub-
lished annually by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Data reported in
this publication usually originate from central banks and public debt agencies.
1Luxembourg and Greece do not report su¢ cient data and are therefore omitted.
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Insert Table 1 approximately here
In Table 1, as in Favero et al. (1997), Blanco (2001), Codogno et al. (2003), and Gomez-Puig (2006, 2008,
2009), we correct the pre-EMU yield spreads for the foreign exchange and ination component, approximated
by the swap di¤erential. The adjusted spread is therefore equal to the di¤erence between the yield spread
and the swap spread. Liquidity spreads are computed as the di¤erence in spreads between the yields of the
on-the-run and o¤-the-run 10-year benchmark bonds, which are generally the two most recent issues for this
maturity (Warga 1992, Strebulaev 2002, Fleming 2002, Babbel et al. 2004, Jankowitsch et al. 2006). On-the-
run benchmark bonds are more actively traded and intensively monitored than the o¤-the-run benchmark.
They are therefore very liquid (Fleming 2002, Jankowitsch et al. 2006) and we consider their liquidity premium
as negligible, considering the adjusted spread as being essentially associated with default risk.
Swap rates already experienced a strong convergence the year before the introduction of the euro (1998),
compared to the preceding years. The swap spread was already relatively smaller for Austria, Belgium, and
the Netherlands. They had constituted a core of currencies that were strongly and e¤ectively pegged to the
Deutsche Mark inside the European Monetary System (EMS). The largest spreads are found for the higher-
ination volatile currencies of the Southern states (Italy, Portugal, Spain). But even for those countries, a
sharp reduction of the spread is observed, as the introduction of the euro approaches. As for the adjusted
spread, we observe that the exchange rate/ination factor proxied by the swap spread heavily a¤ected the
yield spread for many countries, especially for Southern countries, which is consistent with Blanco (2001)
and Favero et al. (2010).
Post-EMU liquidity spreads are lower than default spreads, as already evidenced by many authors
(Codogno et al. 2003, Geyer et al. 2004, and Jankowitsch et al. 2006), except in Ireland. The largest
countries appear to be the most liquid markets (Germany, France and Italy), as expected according to the
traditional positive link between size and liquidity (Warga 1992, Crabbe and Turner 1995). By contrast, Fin-
land and Ireland exhibit larger liquidity spreads before the EMU, which can justify higher shares of foreign
currency debt. Liquidity has particularly improved for Finnish bonds since the launch of the EMU. Slight
increases in liquidity spreads can be observed for Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands and Spain after
1999. Limited bond supply due to improving public nances could explain this pattern. These results are
consistent with the evidence shown by Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Beber et al. (2009) who support
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the existence of a positive liquidity risk premium after the EMU.
According to the Maastricht Treaty criteria, countries that were more heavily indebted before the EMU,
such as Belgium and Italy, have continuously decreased the total debt-to-GDP ratio in order to approach
the target of 60%. Regarding the currency composition of national debt, a clear decline in the proportion of
the debt denominated in foreign (non-euro) currencies can be observed, with the exception of Spain. Prior
to adopting the euro, most of the membersforeign debt is denominated in currencies of other (future) EMU
members. It not therefore surprising to observe a specic decline in foreign debt in 1999, but the decline
continues during the subsequent years thereafter in any case. Unquestionably, the euro has also allowed the
EMU members to increase the proportion of government securities held by non-residents, which indicates
that the markets for debt issued by the EMU member countries have reinforced their integration. This
phenomenon is in line with a phenomenon of reinforcing the role of default risk and reducing the impact of
ination and devaluation risk in the spread processes, with a limited role of liquidity risk.
In the next sections, we develop a framework that aims at capturing the shift in sovereign debt currency,
while controlling for debt maturity, consecutive to the adoption of euro as a common currency in EMU.
III. Indicators without the EMU
We rst derive the e¢ ciency indicators before the advent of the EMU. When market participants scrutinize
sovereign debt in the absence of the EMU, they must take into account the possibility a¤orded to the
government to levy on ination or on devaluation. These actions serve as tools to decrease the real value
of domestic debt and thus to capture an indirect tax (see Bohn, 1988; Bohn, 1990; Miller, 1997). Investors
monitor these risks and demand a compensation for bearing them. For the government, the existence of the
Eurozone yields e¤ects similar to the interdiction of issuing money, which applies to any province, state or
other public issuer. The main di¤erence with the countries adhering to the EMU is that, in their case, they
transit from the absence to the presence of EMU, and so we can observe and dissect the impact for investors
of their loss of sovereignty.
A. Model setup
Two economies, the domestic and the foreign one, use a di¤erent currency, uD and uF respectively. The
domestic government can issue debt in domestic or in foreign currency units on the debt market. This
government has a target debt maturity T and wishes to pay back a given amount in real terms, normalized
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to 1 unit of the foreign currency, by issuing zero-coupon bonds. When dening its debt structure, it chooses
the face value D of debt issued in the domestic currency, given that the face value of the foreign debt is the
residual amount F = 1 D. The government can also set the debt maturities, TD for domestic debt and TF
for foreign debt, provided that the average maturity, weighted by face value, is equal to T : DTD+FTF = T:
Face value and average debt maturity are exogenously dened by the government. Debt mix should be chosen
so as to minimize the aggregate interest cost of debt.
The government is already locked into the current scal and monetary policies, as well as the level of
government expenditures. The impact of these policies is summarized by the stochastic process of the total
debt to the GDP, named  (t), represented by the following Arithmetic Brownian Motion:
ln  (t) = 20 + 1t+ 2Z(t) (1)
where Z(t) is the time-t value of a one-dimensional Brownian Motion2 . Standard useful indicators for
investors are coe¢ cients 0 and 1 representing the political commitment to the governments public decit,
and  standing for the volatility of public decits due to random shocks to the economic and political
conditions. In particular, the linear time trend can be interpreted by market participants as a political
commitment to increase or decrease decits along a given political line. A value of 1 = 0 stands for a
commitment to a steady evolution of the debt ratio3 . As we focus on the di¤erential impact of the proportion
of domestic and foreign debt in the spread components, the debt process is further decomposed in a domestic
and a foreign part ln  (t) = ln F (t) + ln D(t) where:
ln  j(t) = 0 + jj:t+ Z(t); j = D;F (2)
The denition of the cost of debt should be independent of the countrys monetary policy. Thus, it
is computed in foreign currency units. Assuming that the existence of a nominal money market account
is guaranteed for each economy, the exchange rate process X(t) between uD and uF follows a Geometric
Brownian Motion represented by:
X(t) = X(0) exp f(x0 + xtD)t+ xZx(t)g (3)
2All processes are expressed under the risk-adjusted probability measure, which is assumed to exist for each type of risk.
3We prefer this specication to a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process because the evolution of the debt ratio is an essential tool of
budgetary policies, and so one should observe a rm drift in this ratio corresponding to a particular political orientation.
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where x0 represents the structural drift of the exchange rate process, xt reects the market impact of the
governments debt management, and Zx(t) is a SBM and corr(Zx(t); Z(t)) = x . Meese and Rogo¤ (1983)
show that a simple random walk model of the exchange rate performs as well as any other one. The
introduction of D in the drift term is the natural consequence of the e¤ect of the proportion of domestic debt
on the ination level and process as well as on the governments incentive to devaluate. A negative value of
x0 or xt means respectively that uF is weaker than uD; or that the management of public decits is less
e¤ective in the foreign country.
A government seldom makes an outright default. Rather, it may repeatedly force debt restructuring
or renegotiation (Bulow and Rogo¤, 1989). For this reason, government debt can be priced using similar
reduced-form models of default credit (and other) events, as suggested by Du¢ e and Singleton (1999). These
authors show that we can allow for default risk (and other possible risks) by replacing the discount rate
r(t) with a default-adjusted discount rate r(t) + s(t). When default (or another event) occurs, bondholders
recover a fraction proportional to the pre-default market value, which is still subject to default risk. In this
study, we are interested in minimizing the spreads s(t) associated with the various risks of the bond. The
cost of debt is then dened as the average yield spread to maturity of each type of debt, expressed in foreign
currency units, weighted by the corresponding promised amount and maturity. In order to stick to the e¤ect
of debt composition on this weighted average cost, we assume an independent interest rate process. The cost
function is thus:
C(0) = DTDYD(TD) + FTFYF (TF ) (4)
where Yj(Tj); j = D;F is the annual yield spread to maturity of a zero-coupon bond issued by the domestic
government, expressed in currency uF , respectively on the domestic and the foreign debt market. This cost
function can be rewritten as:



















where sj(t); j = D;F is the spot spread of a zero-coupon issued by the domestic government respectively on
the domestic and the foreign debt market. Through this cost function, the government attempts to minimize
the weighted average cost of debt to convince the market of the e¤ectiveness of its debt management.
To derive our indicators, our main challenge is to characterize the term structure of spreads associated
with domestic and foreign debt. In addition to default risk, sovereign spreads should capture the risks of
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surprise ination and currency devaluation as these factors threaten bond value. The existing literature
suggests that the main determinant of the spread of foreign debt would be default risk, whereas devaluation
and ination risks would primarily a¤ect domestic debt . Kremer and Mehta (2000) study a model in which
governments are more inclined to default if a large proportion of their debt is held by foreigners, because each
government cares about the welfare of its citizens. The authors extend their model to include a government
that could credibly commit to repaying but that prefers to issue domestic-currency-denominated debt rather
than foreign-currency-denominated debt. Claessens et al. (2004) show that higher ination is associated with
a higher share of domestic currency debt.
Devaluation and default are voluntary actions taken by the government. These decisions can be triggered
by shocks similar to the ones a¤ecting the ratio of debt over GDP, but they can also be motivated by the
governments debt management strategy. Ex ante, on e¢ cient debt markets, this propensity to devaluate or
to default on debt would be recognized by the market participants and the government in question would be
penalized by the proceeds of debt issues through a higher risk premium.
Default risk, although in principle avoided on the domestic market through the ability to print money,
could a¤ect domestic debt because the social benet of the relief of debt pressure may exceed the additional
political cost of defaulting on domestic together with foreign debt (Nielsen, 1999). Similarly, nancial markets
might fear that a devaluation could lead the country to weaken its potential ability to pay o¤ foreign debt in
case of trouble, because of the increase in the political and social costs of a further devaluation.
Finally, a potential explanation for sovereign spreads relates to liquidity issues (Amihud and Mendelson,
1991; Warga, 1992; Kamara, 1994; Krishnamurthy, 2002). Investors may require a liquidity premium for
holding "illiquid" assets in order to reward them for bearing higher transaction costs, including taxes. The
relative lack of liquidity of debt denominated in the (less liquid) domestic currency unit can lead a government
to issue greater debt in foreign currency units. Similarly, the liquidity premium on foreign debt can be
conditional on the liquidity level of the domestic debt, given the smaller number of market participants.
We therefore consider that the foreign spread is made up of three components: one related to direct credit
risk, and two relating to the indirect e¤ects of devaluation and liquidity risk. Similarly, the domestic spread
involves four components: two due to direct devaluation and liquidity risks (the former incorporating ination
risk), and one due to indirect default risk. Since all these risks are manifested through risk premiums, they
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are considered to be additive. They exhibit the following structure:
sj(t) = j(t) + j(t) + 	j(t) (6)
where j = D;F: The rst term j represents the default spread; j is the devaluation spread, where the
domestic spread includes ination risk; and 	j stands for the liquidity spread.
B. Debt valuation
Parsimony is necessary to derive interpretable optimality results and to analyze the subsequent compar-
ative statics. We assume all spreads in equation (6) to be normally distributed with no mean-reversion.4
Consider rst default risk. Unlike companies, governments cannot simply go bankrupt, because their coun-
try cannot be merely liquidated. Rather, the state of default is likely to be associated to the incapacity of
meeting coupon payments, or to the willingness to scale down the face value of outstanding debt. These situ-
ations involve both a proportion of debt remaining alive after default and, more importantly, that remaining
debt still being submitted to the future default risk of the very same country (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
The reduced-form model of default proposed by Du¢ e and Singleton (1999), who represent the spread as
the product s(t) = h(t)l(t) where h(t) is the arrival rate of default and l(t) is the loss rate upon default,
is particularly suited to this situation.5 For the case of foreign debt, intrinsic default risk is the primary
component of the cost of debt. It is mostly the outcome of a political decision by the government and the
level of risk aversion. In addition, the average remaining maturity of this type of debt, (TF   t); weighted
by the proportion of foreign debt, F , inuences the decision to default. A high weighted average time to
maturity negatively a¤ects the incentive to default on foreign debt (consistent with Missale and Blanchard,
1994), because of the negative relationship between maturity and the present value of a zero-coupon debt.
We thus nd the product F (TF   t) in the spread denition. Finally, some decisions to default depend on the
total stock of debt to GDP, sensitive to the composition of new debt and to unexpected shocks in economic
conditions, which is represented by process ln  F (t). This is in line with Faini (2006) who nds that scal
4The choice of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck or a square-root process, which both feature a mean-reverting behavior, might better
reect policy changes in the long run, but the gain in the spread specication would not be signicant while it would add useless
complexity in the model. The requirement that spreads are linear is not too stringent, because it is not a strict pricing exercise.
We explicitly ruled out the Geometric Brownian Motion specication because it involves a lognormal behavior of the spreads
and rules out negative values of the spreads. Such a requirement should not hold at all in the paper.
5The case of the Greek sovereign debt, whose rescue plan design by the EU involved a write-o¤ of part of the debt but no
outright default, illustrates the relevance of this assumption.
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policy and debt levels signicantly a¤ect both sovereign bond spreads and the overall level of interest rates
in the EMU. Thus, we characterize the foreign default spread as:
F (t) = 0 + tF (TF   t) +  ln  F (t) (7)
To get the indirect e¤ect of default risk on the domestic spread, the arrival risk of default is lowered by
a fraction corresponding to the additional social cost of defaulting on domestic debt. The trade-o¤ between
D and TD is essentially similar as for foreign debt. This yields the following:
D(t) = 

0 + tD(TD   t) +  ln  D(t)

(8)
where  represents the propensity to default on domestic debt conditional on defaulting on foreign debt. It
is negatively related to the social and political costs of domestic default (see Alesina et al., 1992).
The analysis of devaluation spreads is very similar. Devaluation involves a sudden drop in the market
value of debt, with its associated arrival and magnitude risks. The domestic spread is directly a¤ected by this
risk, while the foreign spread only bears this risk indirectly. The reasons for devaluing are essentially of the
same kind as for defaulting: political, strategic (and therefore related to the level of domestic debt and to its
maturity) and stochastic. In addition, the domestic devaluation spread integrates the governments incentive
to control ination, since it benets from an ination taxon its outstanding domestic debt (Giavazzi and
Pagano, 1990, Claessens et al. 2004). The spreads exhibit a structure similar to the default risk ones:
D(t) = 0 + tD(TD   t) +  ln  D(t) (9)
F (t) =  [0 + tF (TF   t) +  ln  F (t)] (10)
where  is the indirect market impact of a devaluation of the domestic currency on the foreign debt; it is an
indicator of market condence. Note that if the Fisher e¤ect holds perfectly, we have that 0+0 = x0 and
t D = xt, as the impact of devaluation risk o¤sets the expected currency depreciation: only unexpected
currency and devaluation risks remain. We do not net devaluation with currency risks however, because these
two processes do not necessarily o¤set each other in the post-EMU situation.
As for liquidity spreads, we can use a similar approach, with the direct impact set on the domestic spread:
	D(t) =  0 +  tD(TD   t) +   ln  D(t) (11)
	F (t) = 





where  is the indirect market impact of the (il)liquidity on the foreign debt.
This complete characterization of the spread processes enables us to assess the cost of nancing through
the following Proposition (all proofs are available upon request):
Proposition 1 The cost of nancing one face value unit of government debt through a proportion D of
domestic debt with maturity TD and the rest of foreign debt, with an average maturity of T; is given by:
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)t + (1  ) t + (1  ) t + ( +  +  )D   ( +  +  )F  (17)
V = 2 [
 
1  2 2    1  22 + (1  2) 2 ] + 2x + 2  xx   +   +  (18)
Proposition 1 represents the basis for the analysis of sovereign debt management by market participants.
The cost function appears to be quadratic in the strategic arguments. The subsequent analysis is developed
for a government whose only strategic variable is the proportion of domestic debt, leaving maturity constant.6
C. Optimal debt mix
If the government sets identical maturities for domestic and foreign debt, the optimization problem has
one strategic variable D: Denoting T single maturity of all debt; the solution to this problem has the form:
Proposition 2 If the maturities of foreign and domestic debt are equal to a constant T; the optimal propor-
tion of domestic debt, denoted Dopt , is given by:
Dopt =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 i¤ Y  0 and X + Y  0
D =  K112(K21+K22T ) i¤ 2X + Y > 0 and Y < 0
1 i¤ 2X + Y  0 and X + Y < 0
(19)
6The joint determination of optimal debt mix and maturities produces similar results. To save space, it is left out of the
paper. Detailed results are available upon request.
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where Y = K11and X = K21 +K22T:
The rst case, leading to an optimal decision to borrow entirely on the foreign market, involves the fact
that Y  0 and that X is positive or negative provided jXj  Y . The qualitative analysis depends on
the maturity: if T is high, K22 will be dominant in X, whereas K21 is the driver for low values of T: The
decisions to borrow fully on the domestic or on the foreign market must be scrutinized with di¤erent elements
depending on whether short term or long term debt is issued.
Consider rst short term debt. A government should choose to borrow the entire amount on the foreign
market when the default, liquidity and devaluation risks indicator, K11; is positive. In particular, this
is favored by the following circumstances: the domestic currency is intrinsically weaker than the foreign
currency [x0], the net intrinsic devaluation [(1   )0 and (1   )0] and liquidity risks [(1   ) 0 and
(1   ) 0] are high, while the net intrinsic default risk [ (1   )0 and  (1   )0] is low and the
total variance of all sources of risks [V ] is low. None of these factors encompasses parameters whose choice
can be strategically set by the government to minimize the cost of debt; rather, they are the ones on which
the government has the lowest impact. The likelihood of not borrowing short term on the domestic market
increases for a high enough value of the strategic exchange rate risk indicator, K21; i.e. a positive or not too
negative level of the impact of debt management on the exchange rate in the foreign economy [xD], which
has a one-shot e¤ect on the total cost function through the expected exchange rate at maturity. This variable
is more under the governments control than the components of K11, but its inuence on the cost of debt is
lower than variables impacting directly on spreads. It plays the role of an adjustment instrument.
For long term debt, all these factors have a lesser impact. The elements favoring foreign debt are now a low
level of strategic devaluation, default and liquidity risk on foreign debt [t + t +  t] (appearing in K11).
For long maturities, these e¤ects would not be totally dashed by the e¤ect of our fourth indicator, K22: The
expression appearing in this term deserves discussion. One can grasp the intuition underlying this expression
by writing

(t + t +   + t) + ( +  +   + )D
  [(t+t+ t)+ ( + + )F ]: the
rst bracket represents the cost obtained by taking on domestic debt, and the second one represents the cost
if foreign debt is adopted instead of domestic debt. As a whole, this expression thus represents the total
strategic liquidity, devaluation and default e¤ects of domestic borrowing, including its indirect impact on
foreign debt. The analysis is very similar for the other corner solution involving D = 1.
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A government should mix domestic and foreign borrowing when Y < 0 and 2X + Y > 0; implying
X > 0: Under the same analysis as before, these conditions mean that intrinsic elements would be favorable
to domestic borrowing, but strategic e¤ects suggest the adoption of foreign debt, both for short term and
long term debt. Comparative statics for D in (19) yield Corollary 3, while xing the debt mix and letting
the maturity of domestic and foreign debt vary produces Corollary 4:
Corollary 3 If the maturities of foreign and domestic debt are equal; the following inequalities obtain:8><>: D
  12 ;D21   D11;D22  D12 i¤ 0 <  Y  X
D > 12 ;D21 >  D11;D22 > D12 i¤ 0 < X <  Y < 2X
(20)
where Dij = @D

@Kij
; i; j = 1; 2; Y = K11 and X = K21 +K22T .
Corollary 4 If the optimal proportion of domestic debt, denoted Dopt is xed, the optimal maturity of
domestic debt is equal to T D =
 (K11+K21D)
2K22D
The pivot value of D; i.e. the one for which the impact of X and of Y is balanced, is found to be 12 :
Again, there is not much di¤erence in the treatment of long term or short term debt, since the same kinds of
tendency are to be observed. The sensitivity of the optimal proportion of domestic debt is indeed related to
the ratio  YX . When D
 is in the neighborhood of 0, this ratio is very low, indicating that the optimal debt
ratio is much more sensitive to D11 (resp. D12) than D21 (resp. D22) for short term (resp. long term) debt.
Intrinsic characteristics also dominate for low levels of domestic debt.
IV. Indicators in the Presence of the EMU
Countries adhering to the EMU do not resign their sovereignty over the choice of the optimal debt mix.
Rather, their decisions must reect the changes in devaluation, ination and default risks. Debt management
indicators should be adjusted.
A. Modied model
The advent of EMU implies that all countries share an identical monetary policy, decided by the European
Central Bank (ECB). A single exchange rate, which is inuenced by the aggregate ination process within
the EMU, prevails for every country. It is assumed that the ECB would never decide to devalue the euro, as
this kind of decision implies a political consensus of all member countries, who can in principle not put any
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pressure on the central bank. Yet, individual countries can indirectly impact on ination and exchange rates
by setting debt levels and maturities, and by defaulting. The primary task of the ECB is to maintain price
stability. What are concretely the changes involved for investors?
First, the sovereign debt level process has to be reconsidered. Because of the convergence criteria, countries
have to ensure a tighter control of their budget decit. However, although the necessary debt level relative to
GDP and yearly budget decit were initially set as conditions for entering the EMU, experience shows that
this was mainly meant to force a political commitment for problemcountries like Belgium or Greece. The
debt ratio process for any member country i takes this into account, and is split according to each countrys
domestic and foreign debt components as in equation (2):




; j = D;F (21)
where the main change is the intervention of a factor i impacting on the drift and di¤usion terms, representing
the governments political commitment to control the evolution of debt: if i0 > 0 (too high debt level) or
if it > 1 (budget decit out of control), i < 1 and the country is forced to put all its e¤orts towards the
limitation of decits, including the ones resulting from unanticipated shocks.
Second, the exchange rate process of the euro with respect to the reference currency applies to all member
countries. It has the form:
















where wi is the weight of each countrys total debt in the total debt issue, and Di is the proportion of this
debt denominated in euros. The introduction of this weighted sum makes the exchange rate di¤er essentially
from (3), because each country has an indirect impact through the proportion chosen, although the total
debt e¤ect is mainly out of control. For formerly strong currencies like the German mark, x00 > xi0 and/or
x0t > xit; while the reverse holds for weaker currencies. Parameter 
 
x stands for the adverse e¤ects of the
lack of credibility of the no bail outclause: if market participants believe that the member countries could
bail out one of them in case of di¢ culty, this weakens the euro.
Devaluation risk collapses to ination risk in the EMU setup, and this risk is common to all countries.
Even though each country still experiences its own ination risk spread, ination surprise and di¤erentials
across countries narrow to persistently low levels. Since the ECB strongly commits to deliver an annual
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ination rate close to 2% at the EMU level, there is a sharp convergence in the medium-term ination rates.
The impact of each individual issue is reduced to the weight of each country in the total debt issue in the
EMU. The contribution of each country to the aggregate ination process is accordingly reduced and so the
ination spread. This follows a new spread process:




itwiDi(TiD   t)] + zii ln  iD(t) (23)
where zi is another weighting factor, applied to the contribution of each countrys ination process to the
overall ination in EMU. The structural ination (0i0), as well as ination drift 
0
it are expected to translate
the ECBs main objective of price stability in the euro-zone.  0 represents undesirable e¤ects of bailing out
countries in case of virtual default, violating the no bail out clause.
As before, foreign as well as domestic debt are subject to recurrent default risk. The foreign debt spread
is represented by a process very similar to equation (7):






itFi(TiF   t) + 0i ln  iF (t) (24)
and here, +i0 is a cost-reducing term arising from the governments ability to call upon the solidarity of other
EMU members in case of virtual default. The other parameters are also likely to be higher than in (7), as
there are fewer instruments available for a government to provide a substitute to default through ination or









itDi(TiD   t) + 0i ln  iD(t)

(25)
Finally, both domestic and foreign debt spreads would still reect compensation for liquidity risk. The
emergence of a larger market size and a broader range of market participants can surely have a benecial
e¤ect on debt liquidity, notably through increasing cross-ownership. However, the fact that government
bonds are still issued by separate government debt agencies with di¤erent needs, strategies, procedures and
instruments may reect a signicant residual fragmentation. Gomez-Puig (2006) highlights the fact that
the benets of the EMU can be partly mitigated by the possible increased competition between euro-area
government securities markets. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) support the existence of a positive liquidity
risk premium after the EMU. In addition, the focus on the 10-year bond segment in combination with a
limited bond supply, as a result of improving public nances, can partially explain the presence of a liquidity
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premium. The liquidity spread process presents the following familiar form:
	D(t) =  
0
i0 +  
0
itDi(TiD   t) +  0i iD(t) (26)




 0i0 +  
0
itFi(TF   t) +  0i ln  iF (t)

(27)
B. Optimal mix for a member country with no coordination of debt policies
Consider rst that each government takes as given the level of domestic and foreign debt of all other
member countries. It is easy to solve the optimization problem every country should face:
Proposition 5 The cost of nancing one face value unit of government debt of member country i through
a proportion Di of domestic debt with maturity TiD and the rest of foreign debt, with an average maturity of
Ti; is given by:



























































  (1  0i)0it + (1  0i) 0it + wi0it + (0i0i +  0i + zii)iiD   iiF (0i + 0i 0i)(32)























Corollary 6 If the maturities of foreign and domestic debt are equal to a constant Ti; the optimal proportion
of domestic debt for country i, denoted Dopti , is given by:
Dopti =
8>>>><>>>>:




i¤ 2Xi + Yi > 0 and Yi < 0
1 i¤ 2Xi + Yi  0 and Xi + Yi < 0
(34)
where Yi = Ki11 and Xi = Ki21 +Ki22Ti: The cases mentioned encompass all possible parameter values.
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Compared with the preceding section, there are some di¤erences to be discussed in the composition of the
constants. First, investors should notice that the inuence of each countrys strategic management factors
on the exchange rate and ination is much lower in the EMU. They impact Ki21; through wix0D; and Ki22
through wi
0




it which is set at the pan-European level. Their signs depend
on the strength of the global monetary policy, but they drive the national borrowing choices. If they are
negative, corresponding to a tight policy compared to the reference economy, Ki21 < 0 and Ki22 < 0. This
case corresponds to full domestic borrowing for all countries. If the debt policy is perceived as permissive,
which is the case if x0t > 0 and 
0
it > 0; then Ki21 > 0 and Ki22 decreases. Furthermore, the weight of the
country in total debt also provides the relative importance of these factors for the determination of each
countrys mix. For heavy borrowers, Ki22 is more likely to be higher and the optimal borrowing decision
depends on the relative levels of Ki11 and Ki21: The results of Corollary 3 apply, inducing countries whose
weight is large in the EMU, to borrow more on the foreign market than would smaller issuers.
Second, credibility of the no bail out clause has asymmetric impacts. The cost-reducing e¤ect of a decrease
in default risk if other countries bail out the one that defaults is included in Ki00 and in Ki11; but in the
latter case this is moderated by a factor (1 0i). The global resulting increases in the ination and exchange
rates both appear in Ki11, which is the only parameter intervening in the determination of the optimal debt
proportion, and is essentially a short term factor. Therefore, the lower the credibility of the no bail out
clause, the higher the incentive to borrow on the foreign market for countries whose social cost of defaulting
on domestic debt is high. Intuitively, if i is close to 0, this means that defaulting in the foreign market is
not likely to coincide with a default on domestic debt.
Third, parameters that seem unchanged are actually crucial for the assessment of the credit quality of
member countries. Specically, Ki11 and Ki22 are both very sensitive to credit quality. For T large enough,
Ki11 > K11. In this case, EMU membership could lead to either an increase or a decrease in the optimal debt
proportion. However, the impact of the di¤erence between 0i and i is more pronounced for Ki22; driving
up the optimal ratio. Hence, the greater the di¤erence in social cost of domestic default incurred by entering
the EMU, the more pronounced the incentive to issue domestic debt. By contrast, when T is low and if
the no bail out clause is not credible (for a high value of +i0), the e¤ect of monetary union goes univocally
towards an increase in the proportion of domestic debt. If the no bail out clause is credible, for low enough
maturities, an increase in default risk could lead to a more pronounced foreign indebtedness.
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C. Optimal coordination policy
So far, all parameters that were beyond the control of the government have been considered as given,
including the wiDi; which resulted from the same optimization process from other countries. However, if
they were all to try to do this at the same time, they would need to know each others choice of weights and
debt proportions, which can only be done with some coordination. It is su¢ cient just to optimize the joint
problem, of course, but the practical implementation of this exercise would require either strong political
integration or considerable market pressure. We introduce a Pareto e¢ cient coordination procedure by a
central borrowing agency. For the EMU as a whole, the total cost of debt is the weighted sum of the
individual costs. By minimizing this sum, a central agency could x the optimal domestic debt level, and
reallocate this issue to individual countries using the same optimization process at the country level, hereby
decreasing the vulnerability of the aggregate sovereign debt.
To illustrate this idea, consider a situation where all countries wish to issue debt with the same maturity
T; but where they di¤er with respect to their weight in total debt, their total debt process and their default
risk. The coordination of debt policies by a central agency allows us to formulate the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 If each of the N EMU member countries issues at the same time wi face value units of
government debt with identical maturity T , with
P
i wi = 1; through a proportion Di of domestic debt and
the rest of foreign debt, the debt allocation




1 ;D2 = D
opt









where DoptE = argmin
PN
i=1 wiCi(0) characterizes a Pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium.
Such an allocation could not be made by countries alone, because xing the aggregate debt level gives
them the incentive to borrow fully on either market, depending on the behavior of the default spread.
On the other hand, focusing on the determination of the optimal global borrowing is impossible without
knowing the allocation of domestic debt among member countries, as the associated default risks appear
in the total cost function. These two problems cannot be disentangled, nor can they be solved individually.
This result corresponds to the idea put forward by Nielsen (1999) more than a decade before the 2010 Greek
crisis. He emphasizes the need for a mechanism that would coordinate debt management policies. Such a
coordination accompanies the determination of the optimal aggregate debt. If the determination of all debt
is not simultaneous, Proposition 7 collapses to Corollary 6.
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V. Structural evolution of EMU debt mix
We examine whether our theoretical framework is consistent with some of the observed debt structure
developments by analyzing the evolution of sovereign debt mix around the creation of EMU. The key drivers
of the evolution of sovereign debt issued by EMU members are reviewed before and after the adoption of the
single currency in 1999. The e¤ectiveness and the appropriateness of their debt management are analyzed in
light our e¢ ciency indicators. We rst review the evolution of the key structural and strategic variables. We
then introduce the calibrated values of the parameters in our model and verify whether the actual debt mix
and maturities are in line with the theoretical predictions driving to a minimization of the cost of debt.
Before the EMU, Austria and Finland exhibited a higher proportion of foreign debt than the other future
EMU countries (Table 1). This empirical nding is especially strong for Finland, for which the proportion
of foreign debt was even above 50% in 1994 and 1995.7 The observed evolution of the Finnish case can be
understood through our theoretical cost-minimization model. Table 2 reports the mean values of the di¤erent
key variables of the model during the 1994-1998 period.
Insert Table 2 approximately here
Our model predicts that Finnish debt should have a fully foreign structure before the EMU (Dth = 0%).
The strategic exchange rate risk indicator, K21; is positive and exhibits the highest coe¢ cient after Italy.
Therefore, the impact of debt management on the exchange rate in the foreign economy is quite strong.
The default, devaluation and liquidity risk indicator K11 is globally large and positive, which also favors
foreign debt. Note that these stylized facts mostly result from the relatively low intrinsic default risk and
the very high net intrinsic devaluation and liquidity risks. The signs of i (positive) and i (negative)
indicate further why foreign debt is preferred. The propensity to default on domestic debt (conditional on
defaulting on foreign debt) is positive, while the indirect impact of a devaluation of the domestic currency
on foreign debt is negative. Finally, the opportunity cost indicator K22 is negative. The savings obtained by
taking on domestic debt are small and presumably slightly higher than the opportunity cost if foreign debt
is used instead, but this fact does not o¤set the importance of K11. In other words, X + Y > 0: This latter
observation could explain why Finland has limited the proportion of foreign debt. These results show that
the Finnish debt structure was not inconsistent with an e¢ cient cost minimization policy.
7Yearly data and estimates are available upon request.
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Parameters are also consistent with likely higher foreign debt ratios for Austria. Our estimation suggests
that optimality requires a very high amount of proportion debt (K11 is strongly positive and K22 slightly
negative). Some elements could have induced Austria to restrain this proportion. The intrinsic devaluation
and liquidity risk are much lower than in Finland, since the Austrian schilling was somehow pegged to the
German mark, which may justify less relative foreign debt. A negative i suggests signicant social and
political costs of defaulting on domestic debt. Similarly, i is positive, translating a greater impact of a
devaluation on foreign debt. These examples illustrate that each indicator of the model cannot be considered
in isolation. Only the combined e¤ect determines the appropriateness of the debt structure.
Our theoretical model is also consistent with the pattern exhibited by Italy. A higher uncertainty and a
strongly negative K11clearly limits the use of foreign debt. Positive values of i and i both suggest that
the market expected a signicant impact of a devaluation of the lira on the Italian foreign debt. Our model
predicts 100% domestic debt for Italy while the actual average ratio was 92.8%. One coe¢ cient in favor of
lower domestic debt is the opportunity cost indicator, K22 , that is slightly positive, but overall X + Y < 0.
The case of the Netherlands, whose proportion of foreign debt is nil (Table 1), is also instructive. The
Dutch solution is therefore an extreme one. This empirical nding is hardly unexpected and can be explained
by the theoretical model that also predicts Dth = 100%. Another point is also the average term to maturity
of the total (domestic) Dutch debt that is relatively higher than in other future EMU countries, and this
does not favor mixed borrowing. The other future EMU members exhibit coe¢ cients favoring more domestic
debt. For example, we obtain for France and Spain negative K11 and K22, all of which clearly call for the
observed domestic debt proportions of almost 100%.
The introduction of the euro and the EMU has led to dramatic changes for all countries. A general decline
in the proportion of foreign debt is observed among all the EMU members. Remarkably, Finlands proportion
of foreign debt plummets from 61.2% in 1994 to 0% in 2007. Similarly, Irish foreign debt drops from 39.4%
in 1995 to nil in 2003. In contrast, before the EMU, these two countries have good reasons to issue relatively
higher proportions of foreign debt. However, after 1999, they are induced to reduce sharply this proportion.
According to our framework, heavy borrowers should borrow more on the foreign market. Together with
Portugal, Finland and Ireland report the lowest borrowing weights in the total debt in the eurozone. The
fact that they are light borrowers is probably not the only reason. At the same time, the other countries are
also led to reduce the proportion of foreign debt, but more smoothly than Finland and Ireland.
20
Insert Table 3 approximately here
Table 3 reports the model coe¢ cients calibrated on the period following the introduction of the euro.
Our model supports clearly a corner solution for all countries. All these countries should have 100% domestic
debt. They all report a strongly negative K11, which favors a high proportion of domestic debt. This strong
e¤ect is not o¤set by K21 and K22, namely 2X + Y < 0: This common move is understandable with our
model. For example, we rst consider Austria. Similar to Finland and Ireland, Austria has decreased its
foreign debt ratio from 25.7% in 1994 to 2.3% in 2010. For that country, K11 is already negative without the
variance term (-4.7) according to our estimation. In Ki11; the evolution of the credit-related component the
rst term of this expression is negative. It is interesting to notice that ii0; i
0
it;and i have all changed
their sign, which may suggest that the sign of i has changed from negative to positive, which means that
defaulting in the foreign market is now more likely to coincide with default on domestic debt.
Finland also has a K11 that is strongly negative even without the variance term. The sign of i has
also changed, but in contrast to Austria, i becomes negative, suggesting that social and political cost on
defaulting on domestic debt has increased, leading to the preference for domestic debt. The variance has
fallen, which could be partly explained by the disappearance of devaluation risk. The situation of Italy did
not change compared to the ex-ante EMU period. K11 is still negative, i and K22 are still positive.
Belgium and Ireland report full domestic debt in 2010. Their patterns are also consistent with those of
Austria, Finland and Italy. K11 is strongly negative for these countries as well, leading to a full domestic debt
solution and i is positive. For Ireland, the variance is quite signicant and K11 is positive before subtracting
the variance term.
VI. Conclusion
Since the recent EMU sovereign debt crisis, market participants have been scrutinizing more than ever
for (un)sustainable debt levels in assessing default risks. Beyond scal policies and total debt to GDP levels,
investors should not overlook the government debt currency structure and its corresponding maturity in
their valuation. We show that these issues are intimately related, because debt choice is a matter of trade-o¤
between di¤erent sources of costs. Through a simple pricing model, this paper derives indicators to assess
the e¢ ciency of the debt mix choice by a government. Indicators favoring mixed borrowing are shown to
be mostly determined by a set of intrinsic characteristics for those whose cost of domestic debt is large. It
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thus calls for recourse to the foreign market, while strategic factors are more crucial for countries choosing
to borrow on the domestic market. Departures from an optimal combination of domestic and foreign debt
would increase both the total yield spread of the country and its vulnerability to sovereign debt crises.
The situation before the EMU is characterized by the very dissimilar nature of yields attached to the
alternative markets. The change in borrowing conditions can be perceived by the considerable dilution of
each countrys e¤ect on exchange rate risks into the cost of debt function, and the consequences of the
perceived lack of credibility of the no bail out clause are sensitive to short term debt. These consequences are
asymmetric: their benets depend on each countrys propensity to default on domestic debt, while their costs
are commonly shared. Furthermore, the modications in credit quality seem to favor higher proportions of
domestic debt at the optimum, especially for long term debt. Sovereign debt data seem roughly consistent
with our theoretical model, but the analysis of the combined e¤ect of each intrinsic and strategic variable is
important to determine whether the chosen debt mix is optimal.
Introducing the euro as a single currency and the conduct of an independent monetary policy at the level
of the EMU should have opened up the way to a reection on the appropriateness of the debt mix at the
European level. Our results indicate a steady decline in the proportion of foreign debt after the introduction
of the euro, which is consistent with the strong negative structural ination in the EMU. This could be the
result of the primary task of the ECB, which is the ght against ination. One should now to consider
whether an independent monetary policy is consistent with allowing governments to decide freely on their
debt currency mix, which comes after the setting of the sovereign government expenditures and tax policies.
The decision of many European countries to primarily issue euro-denominated debt, although broadly
consistent with our prediction, leads to corner solutions that might not be fully cost-e¤ective. Given the large
overall outstanding debt of EMU countries underpinning the sovereign debt crisis, European governments
should not overlook the importance of nding sources of cost savings, and we believe that the currency decision
should contribute to this reection. We emphasize that a central, coordinated approach to determine debt
levels and maturities could result in a Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. The idea of issuing "euro bonds", following
the Greece debt crisis, is a step going in that direction, but it is motivated by urgency. Long-term economic
gains shared across the EMU countries could be achieved by designing a structural mechanism that manages
debt composition for the benet of all. This could further reassure investors about the e¢ ciency and the
credibility of the sovereign debt structure in the EMU.
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Table 1. Average yield spreads and debt ratios.
Spread data (in bps) Debt ratios (in %)
Swap Default Liquidity Total Tot./GDP Mkt./GDP Foreign
pre pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post
GER - - - -1.0 2.7 23.0 39.5 19.8 36.4 0.0 0.2
AUS 1.9 9.3 17.2 3.5 2.6 14.8 19.7 57.2 61.5 43.6 54.3 26.4 8.9
BEL 25.5 11.1 21.2 7.6 4.5 42.7 25.6 111 94.6 102 87.5 6.6 0.9
FIN 66.8 -9.8 4.0 18.6 9.6 70.9 12.7 62.6 40.7 54.1 38.0 47.0 5.7
FRA 13.4 6.0 12.5 3.6 0.8 23.0 13.3 43.2 53.1 38.1 49.7 5.9 0.0
IRL 53.7 4.7 37.7 10.4 10.3 58.2 46.3 64.2 32.4 56.4 31.0 33.3 1.7
ITA 231 39.8 38.2 10.1 3.3 277 41.6 112 101 103 89.6 7.2 1.8
NET 0.7 -7.2 9.0 6.5 3.9 0.1 12.9 56.0 44.5 47.4 43.4 0.0 0.6
POR 228 13.4 41.3 N/A 5.6 241 46.9 57.4 64.3 41.1 51.1 N/A 2.4
SPA 204 13.6 25.4 6.1 5.1 224 30.1 53.5 41.9 47.6 40.0 2.7 2.3
This table reports on the left panel the average swap spread, the default spread, the liquidity spread and the
total yield spread for the benchmark 10-year government bonds. On the right panel, the table reports the ratios of
average total government debt-to-GDP, average marketable debt-to-GDP, and debt denominated in foreign currency
to marketable debt for 10 member countries of the EMU. Spread data are computed as di¤erences with respect to
the German benchmark 10-year government bond and swap rates. The pre-EMU period columns report the average
values between 1994 and 1998. The post-EMU period columns report the average values between 1999 and 2010.
The swap spread represents the yield spread on 10-year swap contracts. The default yield spread is the di¤erence
between the total yield spread and the swap spread minus the liquidity spread. The liquidity spread is computed
from the di¤erence between the yields of on-the-run and o¤-the-run 10-year government bonds. Country codes:
GER=Germany, AUS=Austria, BEL=Belgium, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, IRL=Ireland, ITA=Italy, NET=the
Netherlands, POR=Portugal and SPA=Spain. Data come from Thomson Financial Datastream and from Central
Government Debt Statistical Yearbooks 1994-2010 (OECD Publishing).
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Table 2. Calibrated model coe¢ cients & predictionspre-EMU period.
Panel A: Model Coe¢ cients
AUS BEL FIN FRA IRL ITA NET POR SPA
0 52.3 118.6 61.7 37.02 85.08 115.6 60.8 N/A 50.6
D 0.02 -0.02 0.005 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 N/A 0.01
F 0.05 -0.42 0.03 0.21 -0.36 -0.17 0 N/A 0.23
xt -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.005 -0.05 -0.0002 -0.01 N/A -0.01
xD -0.004 0.01 0.02 -0.0004 0.01 0.04 0 N/A 0.01
 1.5 N/A -9.1 N/A N/A 6.1 N/A N/A N/A
 -6.2 N/A -9.6 0.8 N/A 5.12 -1.3 N/A 1.9
 -3.9 N/A -3.8 -8.4 N/A 76.9 -0.2 N/A 22.1
 -1.4 N/A 2.1 N/A N/A 62.1 N/A N/A N/A
  -0.8 N/A -5.1 -1.4 N/A -3.2 -0.002 N/A -1.8
  -1.4 N/A -1.8 N/A N/A -6.0 N/A N/A N/A
0 -218.8 N/A 526.8 N/A N/A -751.6 N/A N/A N/A
0 619.0 N/A 630.4 -128.1 N/A -392.2 48.6 N/A -76.6
t -0.6 N/A -0.11 0.22 N/A -0.33 0.03 N/A -0.04
0 311.3 N/A 598.6 705.9 N/A -8975 -80.2 N/A 2066.1
0 38.9 N/A -523.8 N/A N/A -6583 N/A N/A N/A
t 0.22 N/A 2.05 N/A N/A -2.4 N/A N/A N/A
 0 36.4 N/A 522.6 197.1 N/A 327.7 -7.5 N/A 79.5
 0 86.6 N/A -105.6 N/A N/A 646.7 N/A N/A N/A
 t 0.0 N/A 1.12 N/A N/A 0.7 N/A N/A N/A
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Panel B: Model prediction vs. actual movement
K11 + - + - - - - N/A -
K21 - + + - + + 0 N/A +
K22 - N/A - - N/A + + N/A -
X + Y + + + - + - - N/A -
td;f 2.3 N/A 1.4 N/A -3 2.9 -6.5 N/A N/A




(%) 73.5 93.4 53.0 94.1 66.7 92.8 100 N/A 97.3
Panel A of this table reports the calibrated coe¢ cients of the debt ratio, swap spread, liquidity spread and default
spread process during the 1994-1998 period. D (resp. F ) is the rate of change between the total debt to GDP
ratio  t and the proportion of domestic debt D (resp. foreign debt F ), proxied by the slope of the linear regression
between the two variables, 0 being the intercept of this regression. xt and xD are jointly estimated from the
multiple regression lnXt = x0+ xtt + xDD + 't where Xt is the domestic currency nominal e¤ective exchange
rate (denominator is the domestic currency) against a group of 40 trading partners. 0, t and  are jointly
estimated from the multiple regression t = 0 + tDtd +  t + %t where t is the default spread proxied
by the spread of 10-year benchmark government yield over the corresponding swap spread of the same maturity
denominated in the same currency, minus the liquidity spread. td is the average term to maturity of domestic debt.
0, t and  are jointly estimated from the multiple regression. Ft = 0 + tFtf +  t + {t where
Ft is the devaluation spread proxied by the spread of the 10-year swap rate. tf is the average term to maturity
of foreign debt.  0 is the initial value of ,  0,  t and   are jointly estimated from the multiple regression
	Ft =  0 +  tFtf +   t + t where 	Ft is the liquidity spread proxied by the spread between the on-the-
run and o¤-the-run 10-year benchmark bond yields. tf is the average term to maturity of foreign debt. Panel B
reports the likely sign of the three parameters of the model, the likely model prediction for the proportion of domestic




). td;f is the average maturity di¤erential between
foreign and domestic debt. N/A indicates that the data were not available to estimate the parameter . Country
codes: AUS=Austria, BEL=Belgium, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, IRL=Ireland, ITA=Italy, NET=the Netherlands,
POR=Portugal and SPA=Spain.
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Table 3. Calibrated model coe¢ cients post-EMU period.
Panel A: Model Coe¢ cients
AUS BEL FIN FRA IRL ITA NET POR SPA
0 60.3 100.5 49.8 44.3 27.8 100.6 42.2 46.2 46.9
D 0.002 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.007 0.0003 0.004 0.03 -0.007
F -0.06 0.05 0.16 0 0.17 -0.43 0.29 0.27 -0.72
00 -330.1 -240.5 40.2 N/A 50.1 -556.4 N/A N/A N/A
000 -364.0 6.3 -66.7 -58.1 55.9 -721.9 -133.1 N/A -772.2
00t 0.03 -0.11 0.1 -0.02 -0.1 0.3 0.1 N/A 0.8
 00 58.9 -52.1 -25.2 8.45 -57.4 8.29 22.5 N/A 95.2
0 00 43.5 -103.1 -24.3 N/A -18.4 17.9 N/A N/A N/A
0 0t 0.06 -2.3 -0.2 N/A -0.6 -0.2 N/A N/A N/A
0 5.7 2.84 -1.2 N/A -1.8 6.2 N/A N/A N/A

0
0 5.8 0.8 0.4 1.5 -0.32 5.6 1.6 N/A 6.9
 0 -0.8 0.3 0.2 -0.03 0.6 -0.1 0.2 N/A -0.8
0 0 -0.7 1.2 1.0 N/A 1.0 -0.1 N/A N/A N/A
xt -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
x0D 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
wi 3.2 6.1 1.4 19.5 1.0 30.6 4.9 2.1 7.7
Panel B: Model prediction vs. actual movement
K11 - - - - - - - N/A -
K21 + + + + + + + + +
K22 + + + - - + + N/A +
2X + Y - - - - - - - N/A -
td;f -3.6 -4.72 -2.2 N/A -3.6 2.0 0.2 N/A N/A




91.1 99.1 94.3 100 98.2 98.1 99.4 97.6 97.6
Panel A of this table reports the calibrated coe¢ cients of the total debt-to-GDP ratio, exchange rate, liquidity
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spread and default spread process during the 1999-2010 period. D (resp. F ) is the rate of change between the
total debt to GDP ratio  t and the proportion of domestic debt D (resp. foreign debt F ), proxied by the slope of










where 0t is the default spread
proxied by the spread of 10-year benchmark government yield over the swap spread of the same maturity denominated
in euros, minus the liquidity spread. td is the average term to maturity of domestic debt. 0 00, 
0 0t and 
0 0 are
jointly estimated from the multiple regression 	0Ft= 
0 00+
0 0tFtf+
0 0 t + 
0
t
where 	0Ft is the liquidity spread
proxied by the spread between the on-the-run and o¤-the-run 10-year benchmark bond yields. tf is the average term
to maturity of foreign debt. wi is the weight of the country i s total debt in the total debt issue in the EMU. xt and
xD are jointly estimated from the multiple regression lnXt= x0+ xtt+ xDD + 't where Xt is the euro nominal
e¤ective exchange rate (denominator is the euro) against EER-40 group of trading partners. Panel B reports the
likely sign of the three parameters of the model, the likely model prediction for the proportion of domestic currency




). td;f is the average maturity di¤erential between foreign
and domestic debt. AUS=Austria, BEL=Belgium, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, IRL=Ireland, ITA=Italy, NET=the
Netherlands, POR=Portugal, SPA=Spain.
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